MOORE COUNTY ALPR SUBCOMMITTEE

Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) Systems

Findings and Recommendation

PREPARED BY

Members of the Moore County ALPR Subcommittee

THIS REPORT COVERS

- Technology and data capture
- Court rulings and NC law
- Documented misuse
- Data sharing and federal access
- Cybersecurity and vendor risk
- Effectiveness evidence
- Contract and fiscal exposure
- Jurisdictions that removed Flock
- Removal plan and resolution

October 2026

Current as of October 14, 2026

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This report compiles publicly reported information current as of October 14, 2026. Litigation and legislation in this area are active, and developments after that date are not reflected. This report does not constitute legal advice.

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TAB 1

Executive Summary: The Case for Removal

Purpose

This report presents the findings of four members of the Moore County ALPR Subcommittee, on automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems. Flock Safety, the dominant ALPR vendor, is the principal example throughout, but the recommendation applies to ALPR systems from any vendor. It covers the technology and how its data can be searched, the privacy risks, the court rulings, North Carolina law, the sharing of local data with outside agencies, documented misuse, cybersecurity, the evidence on effectiveness, the county's legal and financial exposure, and the actions taken by other jurisdictions, including two North Carolina counties. It concludes with the authors' recommendation and a proposed removal plan.

The views and recommendation in this report are those of the four subcommittee members who prepared it. The report has not been adopted by the full Moore County ALPR Subcommittee or by the Board of Commissioners.

Recommendation

The authors recommend that the Board of Commissioners end all county funding and county contracts for automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems from any vendor, including Flock Safety, direct the certified deletion of all county-funded ALPR data, and remove all county-funded ALPR equipment.

Why Removal

- **North Carolina counties are already doing this.** The New Hanover County commissioners (4-0, Sept. 8, 2026) and Davidson County commissioners (unanimous, Aug. 24, 2026) canceled their Sheriffs' Flock contracts. Nationwide, 302 jurisdictions in 40 states have ended Flock and 109 more have paused it; Florida and Texas acted statewide in August 2026 (Tab 15).
- **The network is far bigger than the county.** Flock reports more than 120,000 cameras nationwide. County-funded cameras feed a network that agencies in other jurisdictions, other states, and federal agencies have been able to search, sometimes without local officials' knowledge.
- **Misuse is documented, recurring, and caught late.** The Washington Post (Aug. 2, 2026) counted at least 50 officers charged with or accused of misusing Flock and similar systems, often to stalk romantic partners. Five Indianapolis officers were charged in September 2026; an Ohio police lieutenant was indicted on October 13, 2026. Most cases surfaced through victims or outsiders, not routine audits.
- **The constitutional ground is shifting against these systems, in our own circuit.** The federal judge who upheld Norfolk, Virginia's Flock network in January 2026 warned the answer could change as networks grow. That case is now before the Fourth Circuit, whose ruling will bind federal courts in North Carolina. The Supreme Court's June 29, 2026 decision in Chatrie v. United States strengthened the case against warrantless location tracking. And on October 1, 2026, a federal judge in Oklahoma ruled a deputy's warrantless Flock search unconstitutional, calling the network indiscriminate mass surveillance, and suppressed the evidence.
- **North Carolina law does not protect residents adequately.** State law allows 90 days of retention, requires no warrant to search, sets no limit on cameras, and requires no public reporting. The General Assembly expanded ALPRs on state highways in 2026 rather than restricting them. Local removal is the only protection the county fully controls.
- **The security record is poor.** Members of Congress asked the FTC in November 2025 to investigate Flock's security practices. Researchers have published dozens of vulnerabilities, stolen police logins were found for sale, and some Flock video cameras were streaming openly to the internet in December 2025.
- **The benefits are unproven.** Studies claiming crime reductions were run or supplied by the vendor, and independent reviewers found serious methodological problems. CBS News found Flock's headline crime-solving claim unsupported.
- **The vendor's fixes are voluntary and came late.** Flock's CEO apologized in August 2026 and changed defaults only after national reporting. Settings the vendor changes once can change again.
- **Removal eliminates the county's exposure** to civil rights claims, misuse liability, breach costs, and a possible adverse Fourth Circuit ruling, and ends a recurring expense.

A note on roles. The Sheriff is an independently elected constitutional officer, and nothing in this report questions the integrity of the Sheriff's Office or its personnel. The authors' recommendation concerns county appropriations and county contracts, which are the Board's responsibility. As commissioners in Davidson County observed when they made the same decision in 2026, the concern is not the current officeholders but the design of the system: who else can reach the data, and how it could be used in the future.

How This Report Is Organized

Tab	Title	What it establishes
1	Executive Summary	The recommendation and the reasons for it
2	Technology Primer	What ALPRs collect and how far the network reaches
3	What ALPRs Capture & Search	What each capture holds and the many ways it can be queried
4	How Data Is Aggregated	Documented examples of movement histories, patterns, and associations
5	Privacy & Civil Liberties	The harms to residents
6	Court Rulings	The legal trend against mass location tracking
7	Key Court Opinions	Citations and sources for the principal rulings
8	NC Law & County Authority	Why state law is not enough, and the Board's removal powers
9	Data Sharing & Federal Access	How local data escapes local control
10	Documented Misuse	How the systems are abused and why controls fail
11	Cybersecurity & Vendor Risk	How the data has been exposed
12	Common Arguments & Responses	Arguments for keeping ALPRs, and the record in response
13	Contract Exit & Fiscal	How to get out of the contract and what it saves
14	Jurisdictions That Removed Flock	Communities that ended or paused Flock, and why reform failed
15	Removals & Cancellations	All 444 jurisdictions that ended, paused, or rejected Flock
16	Removal Plan & Resolution	Step-by-step removal and draft resolution
17	Glossary & Sources	Terms and full source list

TAB 2

Technology Primer: ALPRs and How Flock's System Works

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) in General

An ALPR is a camera paired with software that reads license plates on passing vehicles and records the plate, the image, the time, and the location. Reads are compared against 'hot lists' such as stolen vehicles, wanted persons, and Amber Alerts, and are stored in a searchable database. Unlike speed or red-light cameras, ALPRs record every passing vehicle, not just violators. North Carolina law prohibits using ALPR data for traffic enforcement.

What Makes Flock Different

- **Cloud network, not a standalone camera.** Flock cameras upload to a hosted platform. Agencies can search not only their own cameras but also cameras of other agencies that share with them, statewide or nationally (the 'National Lookup' or national LPR network).
- **'Vehicle Fingerprint' search.** Flock's software catalogs vehicle make, type, color, and distinguishing features such as roof racks, bumper stickers, and damage. Users can search by these attributes even without a plate number.
- **Scale.** Flock reports more than 120,000 cameras and thousands of law enforcement customers nationwide.
- **Private-sector cameras.** Homeowners associations, retailers, and other businesses buy Flock cameras and can share feeds with police. This extends coverage into areas that public bodies never approved.
- **Low installation friction.** Cameras are commonly solar-powered and pole-mounted. In 2026, Flock began installing some cameras inside radar speed-display signs to reduce vandalism, which makes them harder for the public to see.

Flock Product Lines Commissioners May Encounter

Product	What it does	Concerns to note
Falcon / Sparrow	Fixed license plate reader cameras	Core ALPR privacy and sharing issues
Condor	Pan-tilt-zoom live video cameras	Moves beyond plate reads to continuous video; exposed units found online in Dec. 2025
Raven	Acoustic gunshot detection microphones	Audio surveillance; accuracy questions common to gunshot detection
Drone as First Responder	Remotely dispatched drones (via Flock's 2024 Aerodome acquisition)	Aerial surveillance; see 4th Cir. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (Tab 6)

Product	What it does	Concerns to note
Nova / investigative tools	Data integration and search across sources	Combines ALPR with other data; scope of data sources should be disclosed
FlockOS / integrations	Real-time crime center software, links to other camera systems	Expands what a single login can see

Data Lifecycle

- **Capture:** image plus plate, attributes, time, GPS location.
- **Alerting:** automatic match against hot lists; officers notified in real time.
- **Storage:** on Flock's cloud. Default retention was 30 days until August 2026, when Flock cut its default to 7 days. North Carolina allows up to 90 days, and longer under a preservation request or warrant.
- **Search:** users enter a plate, partial plate, or vehicle description and a stated reason; since August 2026 Flock says a case number is required except in emergencies.
- **Sharing:** controlled by agency settings (none, 1:1 partners, statewide, national). Settings changes may not be visible to elected officials.
- **Audit:** Flock maintains audit logs of searches, including searches of the county's data by outside agencies. These logs are the single most important oversight record.

Key point for commissioners: the county pays for the cameras, but the most consequential decisions (who can search, for what reasons, and how long data lives) are software settings the agency or vendor can change without a public vote. The county cannot reliably control a system whose rules live in a private company's software. Removal is the only setting the county fully controls.

See Tab 3 for the full contents of each capture, the eleven ways Flock data can be queried, and sources for image exhibits.

TAB 3

What ALPR Systems Capture & How They Can Be Searched

What a Single Capture Contains

Each time a vehicle passes a Flock camera, the system stores a still image of the rear of the car together with the data below. Individually a capture is a snapshot; searched together, captures form a record of where a vehicle has been.

Element	What is recorded
Image	Photograph of the vehicle, typically the rear, plus anything else in the frame: other vehicles, pedestrians, storefronts, homes
Plate	Plate number and state; temporary tags and missing plates are flagged
Time and place	Date, time, camera location, and direction of travel
Vehicle attributes ('Vehicle Signature' / 'Fingerprint')	AI-generated make, body type, and color, plus features such as roof racks, bumper stickers, aftermarket wheels, and visible damage
Video (Condor cameras only)	Continuous or recorded video, searchable by description where FreeForm is enabled

An officer searching a plate receives a grid of these captures in time order. That grid is what turns individual snapshots into a travel history. In the Norfolk lawsuit, the city's own data showed one resident's car captured 526 times and another's 849 times in about four and a half months (Tab 2B).

Ways to Query an ALPR Network (Flock's Platform)

Most residents picture a license plate camera as a tool for looking up one known plate. Flock now sells many other ways to query the same data, several of which start with no suspect at all. Features vary by subscription package.

Query type	What the user enters	What comes back	Why it matters
Plate lookup	A full plate number	Every capture of that vehicle on searchable cameras, in time order	Builds a travel history of the vehicle's owner with no warrant
Partial and temporary plate search	Part of a plate, a temporary tag, or a missing plate	All vehicles matching the fragment	Returns many vehicles unconnected to any crime
Vehicle description ('Vehicle Signature' / 'Fingerprint')	Make, type, color, and features such as roof racks, bumper stickers, or damage	All matching vehicles, with or without a readable plate	Searches by appearance, including stickers that may reflect politics or religion

Query type	What the user enters	What comes back	Why it matters
Visual Search	An uploaded photo of a vehicle from any source, such as a doorbell or business camera	Visually similar vehicles across the cameras	Private footage becomes a search key; results are look-alikes, not matches
FreeForm natural-language search	Plain-language descriptions typed like a web search	Matching vehicles from license plate cameras, and on enabled video cameras, matching people	AI interprets the request; Flock's own example is a description of a woman by her clothing
People search	A description of a person's visible appearance (enabled video only)	People on video who match	Flock says no facial recognition is used, but it is still a search for individuals, not cars
Multi-Geo search	Two or more locations and time windows	Every vehicle seen at all of those places	A reverse search: it starts with places, not a suspect, the same structure as the geofence search in Chatrie (Tab 6)
Convoy search	One plate number	Vehicles that repeatedly travel with that vehicle	Maps associations: family, friends, coworkers, partners
Hot lists and custom alerts	Plates or descriptions an officer adds to a watch list; FreeForm alerts on descriptions	Real-time notice whenever a match passes a camera	Live tracking going forward, entered at an officer's discretion
Camera and time filtering	A camera or zone and a time range	Vehicles that passed that point	Shows everyone who visited a particular place, such as near a clinic, church, or rally
Nova (people lookup)	A plate or person	Links the vehicle to a likely owner and to related people using data-broker and public-records sources	Turns a car into a person and that person's network. Leaked material described about 20 data sources and links through marriage or association

Every query type can reach beyond the county. Each search above can run against the county's own cameras, against cameras shared one-to-one, statewide, or, where enabled, through the National Lookup. Sharing settings multiply the reach of every query type (see Tab 9).

What the Query Types Have in Common

- **No warrant is required for any of them** under current North Carolina law. Access is controlled by a typed reason and, since August 2026, a case number.
- **Several start without a suspect.** Multi-Geo, camera filtering, attribute search, and FreeForm begin with a place or description and return everyone who fits, nearly all of them uninvolved.
- **Several reveal relationships, not just locations.** Convoy search and Nova map who a person spends time with.
- **The tool keeps expanding.** Flock has moved from plate lookup to vehicle attributes, image upload, AI natural-language search, people search on video, and people lookup through Nova. Each new capability arrives as a software update or package upgrade, not a new public decision.
- **The vendor sets the limits.** In 2025, after 404 Media reported Nova might use data from breaches, Flock decided not to. That was a company choice, not a legal requirement.

Sources

Flock Safety product pages for LPR, LPR Pro, FreeForm, and FlockOS (accessed Oct. 2026); Government Technology on Flock Advanced Search, Convoy, and Multi-Geo features; 404 Media, 'License Plate Reader Company Flock Is Building a Massive People Lookup Tool' (May 14, 2025) and 'Flock Decides Not to Use Hacked Data in People Search Tool' (May 30, 2025); Prescott Pulse and Maryville Residents for Privacy local investigations (2026).

TAB 4

How ALPR Data Is Aggregated: Documented Examples

A single plate capture shows one car at one place and time. The risk comes from aggregation: combining many captures, many cameras, and many searches. The examples below come from court records and from Flock audit logs released through public-records requests. All figures in this tab were prepared for this report from the cited sources, except the one clearly labeled as an illustration.

1. One Person's Routine: Norfolk, Virginia

In Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, the city's own Flock data, produced in discovery, showed how often two residents with no warrants or charges were captured by 176 cameras over about four and a half months in 2025.




Figure 1. Captures of two Norfolk-area residents. Source: court filing reported by NBC News (Sept. 2025); plaintiffs' reply brief, ECF 179-2.

- Lee Schmidt, a retired veteran, was logged 526 times (about four per day); Crystal Arrington, a health care worker, 849 times (more than six per day).
- Each was captured three or more times on nearly three of every four days.
- An unnamed driver in the case was logged 14 times in six and a half hours.
- The plaintiffs' expert used the data to reconstruct about 15,000 routes within Norfolk, some almost entirely, and the filing states that both Norfolk and Flock use Flock data to infer routes.

- The federal judge found gaps between captures (often miles and 40-50 minutes apart) and held the network was not yet a Fourth Amendment search, while warning this could change as the network grows. That ruling is on appeal (Tab 6).





Figure 2. Illustration using hypothetical data: how ordinary captures, sorted by place and time, reveal a routine.

2. Heat Maps: A Vehicle's 'Pattern of Life'

Flock's platform can display the history of a single searched vehicle as a heat map: every capture of that plate over the retention window, shaded by how often the vehicle passed each camera. Flock's product documentation, as quoted in press coverage, describes viewing a specific vehicle's historical locations in a map view and a heat map as part of a plate search. The result does not need continuous tracking to be revealing; it shows where a vehicle appears most often.



Fictional town and data. Brighter areas show where one vehicle was captured most often over 30 days. Without any other information, the pattern suggests where the driver lives, works, takes a child to school, worships, and receives medical care.

Figure 3. Illustration using a fictional town and hypothetical data, modeled on the heat-map view described above. It is not an image from Flock's software.

The Oshkosh, Wisconsin Episode (April 2026)

- **April 21, 2026:** During a contract renewal vote, Council Member Brad Spanbauer asked Flock's Chief Information Security Officer whether the system creates a heat map of a vehicle's movement from aggregated images of a searched vehicle. The answer was no. The council approved the renewal.
- **April 22, 2026:** Police Chief Dean Smith told a special council meeting that his staff had advised him the system does create heat maps and that he had confirmed it himself that morning. Citing the misrepresentation, he said he could no longer recommend Flock.
- **Result:** The council voted 7-0 to rescind the contract less than 24 hours after approving it, and the department powered off and bagged its 26 cameras.
- **Flock's response:** Flock's chief communications officer confirmed the system's mapping capabilities and described the exchange as a misunderstanding about tracking people rather than vehicles.
- **Why it matters:** A council member who voted for the renewal said many members had believed the system's capabilities were more limited. Elected officials approving these contracts may not be told what the software can do.

3. A Fictional Example: What an ALPR Network Could Reveal About One Resident

Jordan Avery is fictional. The person, places, and schedule below are invented to show what is technically possible with the capabilities described in this report. Each inference uses only camera captures and standard ALPR search tools, as offered on Flock's platform. No other records are involved.

Jordan is a county resident with no criminal record. Jordan drives the same car every day past cameras near home, a child's school, an office park, and other ordinary destinations. Jordan also has an easily described appearance: shoulder-length red hair and a tattoo sleeve on the left forearm. Nothing in Jordan's week is unusual or unlawful.




Figure 4. Fictional example. Circles are plate captures; red marks captures that reveal sensitive information about religion, health, civic activity, or personal relationships. The gold diamond is a video-camera match found by describing Jordan's appearance.

What an Analyst Could Infer

Pattern in the captures	What it suggests
Captures near the same residential street every night and most mornings	Home address, and the hours the house is usually empty
Weekday captures near an elementary school at 7:55 a.m.	Jordan has a child at that school and the time of drop-off
Weekday captures at an office park, 8:20 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.	Employer and work schedule
Sunday 10:15 a.m. and Wednesday 7:00 p.m. near the same church	**Religious affiliation, the specific congregation, and level of involvement (attends midweek study as well as Sunday services)**
Tuesday midday near a cardiology practice; Saturday near a pharmacy	**A possible heart condition and ongoing treatment**
Tuesday evenings near a community center at the time a weekly support group meets	**Possible participation in a recovery or support program**
Thursday evening near the county courthouse during a Board of Commissioners meeting	**Civic or political involvement, possibly as a speaker on a local issue**
Friday 9:45 p.m. near a residence across town; not captured again until 6:50 a.m.	**A personal relationship and where Jordan spends the night**
Saturday afternoon: a person matching Jordan's hair and tattoo on a downtown video camera, minutes after Jordan's car is captured nearby	**Jordan's movements on foot, and confirmation that Jordan (not another driver) was using the car**

What Each Flock Tool Adds

Tool (Tab 3)	What it could show about Jordan
Plate lookup	Every capture of Jordan's car on any searchable camera, in time order, across the retention window (up to 90 days under North Carolina law)
Heat map	The places above, shaded by frequency, in a single image
Convoy search	Vehicles that regularly arrive at church with Jordan's car, identifying fellow congregants, family, or friends
Multi-Geo search	Every vehicle present at both the church on Sunday and the Commission meeting on Thursday
Camera and time filtering	Every vehicle near the community center during the support group's meeting time
FreeForm people search (video cameras)	Video clips of anyone matching a typed description, such as 'person with red hair and a tattoo sleeve,' whether or not Jordan is near the car
Nova people lookup	Jordan's name, and potentially relatives and associates, linked to the plate
National sharing	All of the above available to authorized users at other agencies, in-state and out of state, according to sharing settings

Recognized Without a License Plate

Where an agency also has Flock video cameras with FreeForm search enabled (Tab 3), a plate is no longer needed. A user can type a description and receive video of matching people.

- **The search:** a user types a plain-language description such as 'red hair, tattoo sleeve on left arm.' Audit logs reviewed by 404 Media show real searches describing people by clothing, tattoos, body type, and race.

- **The match:** on Saturday afternoon, a downtown video camera records Jordan walking from a parking lot. The clip appears in the results alongside anyone else who fits the description.
- **The link:** Jordan's car was captured by a plate reader a block away three minutes earlier. Timing and location tie the person on video to the plate, and through the plate (and Nova) to a name.
- **What follows:** once Jordan's appearance is known, Jordan can be found on video without the car: walking downtown, attending an event, or riding with someone else.
- **No facial recognition required:** Flock states its systems do not use facial recognition. Descriptions of hair, tattoos, clothing, and build are enough to narrow the search.
- **Misidentification risk:** appearance searches return everyone who looks similar. Another person with red hair and a tattoo could be wrongly linked to Jordan's car, or to whatever investigation the search was run for.

What It Would Take

- No warrant, no judge, and no suspicion of a crime. Under current North Carolina law, a search requires only a stated law enforcement purpose.
- One user account, at this agency or any agency the data is shared with.
- A few minutes. The searches above are standard features of the platform.

Why This Is Not Hypothetical in Practice

- The inferences rest on the same patterns documented in Norfolk, where two residents were captured three or more times on nearly three of every four days.
- Officers in Indianapolis and elsewhere have been charged with using Flock to track romantic partners, exactly the kind of personal information shown in Jordan's Friday night (Tab 10).
- Agencies have run searches tied to protests and religious or ethnic communities (sections 5 and 6 below).
- The Oshkosh police chief confirmed the heat-map feature exists (section 2).

Inferences can also be wrong. Jordan might be driving a parent to the cardiology appointment, or the Friday stop might be a family visit. Conclusions drawn from plate captures can mislead as easily as they can expose, and the person concerned has no opportunity to correct them.

4. One Search, the Whole Country

In 2025, a Texas sheriff's office ran a search connected to a woman who had self-managed an abortion. EFF's review of the audit logs found that single query reached across the national network.




Figure 5. Reach of one search. Source: EFF audit-log analysis (2025).

5. What Millions of Searches Reveal

EFF obtained Flock audit logs covering more than 12 million searches by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025. Analyzed together, the logs show what the network is used for in practice.




Figure 6. Networks reached by individual protest-related searches. Source: EFF (Nov. 2025).

- More than 50 federal, state, and local agencies ran hundreds of searches connected to protest activity, including demonstrations in February, April, June, and October 2025.
- About 20 percent of searches reviewed gave only vague reasons such as 'investigation,' 'suspect,' or 'query.'
- Denver audit records showed more than 1,400 immigration-related searches of Denver's camera data between June 2024 and April 2025.

These concerns do not depend on the cause involved. A network that can list the vehicles near one demonstration, clinic, or house of worship can do the same for any other.

6. Mapping Groups and Associations

Flock's Convoy feature identifies vehicles that travel together. EFF found that more than 80 agencies used search terms stereotyping Romani people, and that one Texas police department ran a slur six times through Convoy, in effect targeting a whole traveling community without naming a crime. The same tool can map anyone's family, friends, coworkers, or congregation.

7. Searching People, and Uses Beyond Policing

- Audit logs reviewed by 404 Media show searches describing people by clothing, tattoos, body type, and race, such as a 'heavy-set male' in a particular hat.
- A Georgia school district serving about 6,000 students reportedly ran more than 375 Flock searches between January 2025 and March 2026 to verify where families lived for school enrollment.
- In Indianapolis, an officer allegedly searched his ex-wife's car more than 950 times over six months, the same aggregation used for a personal purpose (Tab 10).

8. The Scale of Searching




Figure 7. Reported search volumes. Periods differ and are shown for scale, not direct comparison. Sources: Columbus audit (2026); EFF (2025); Routt County Sheriff (2026); WECT (2026); San Francisco class action complaint (2026, allegation).

In San Francisco, a city compliance audit released in June 2026 found 299 improper searches of the city's camera network over about a year.

Image and Document References

The primary documents below contain the underlying data, audit-log excerpts, and images behind these examples.

Document	What it shows	Where to find it
Plaintiffs' reply brief, Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (ECF 179-2)	Capture frequencies, days with repeated captures, route reconstruction by plaintiffs' expert	ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/ECF-179-2-Pltfs-Reply-ISO-MSJ-Revised-Redactions.pdf
City of Norfolk's brief, Schmidt v. City of Norfolk	The city's account of camera coverage and gaps	courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/schmidt-v-norfolk-defendant-brief.pdf
NBC News, 'Police cameras tracked one driver 526 times in four months' (Sept. 2025)	Plaintiff interviews and capture totals	nbcnews.com
Oshkosh Common Council special meeting, Apr. 22, 2026 (video)	Police chief's statement confirming the heat-map feature	City of Oshkosh meeting archive
WLUK FOX 11, NBC 26, and Oshkosh Northwestern coverage (Apr. 2026)	Council exchange, rescission vote, Flock's response	fox11online.com; nbc26.com; thenorthwestern.com
WHRO, Norfolk ruling coverage (Feb. 11, 2026)	Ruling summary; Christopher Newport University study of camera placement in Hampton Roads	whro.org
EFF, 'How Cops Are Using Flock Safety's ALPR Network to Surveil Protesters and Activists' (Nov. 2025)	Audit-log excerpts and agency list for protest-related searches	eff.org/deeplinks/2025/11
EFF, 'Investigations Expose Flock Safety's Surveillance Abuses: 2025 in Review' (Dec. 2025)	Convoy and Romani-profiling findings; nationwide search fan-out	eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12

Document	What it shows	Where to find it
University of Washington Center for Human Rights, 'Leaving the Door Wide Open'	Network Audit records showing federal access to Washington cities' data	jsis.washington.edu/humanrights
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing, Sept. 23, 2026	Hearing exhibits, including an image captured by a license plate reader	judiciary.senate.gov
Public camera-location maps (DeFlock, All Eyes on Flock, FlockHopper)	Crowdsourced maps of known Flock camera locations, searchable by address or ZIP code	deflock.me and related sites

TAB 5

Privacy & Civil Liberties Risks

1. Tracking People Who Are Not Suspected of Anything

ALPRs record every vehicle, so nearly all stored data concerns law-abiding residents. Individually, a plate read in public reveals little. Aggregated over days or weeks and across a dense network, the data can reconstruct where a person lives, works, worships, receives medical care, and whom they visit. In the Norfolk case, the two plaintiffs' vehicles were captured hundreds of times over roughly four months. Courts call this the 'mosaic' problem (see Tab 6).

2. Sensitive Locations

Members of Congress have pointed out that ALPR data can reveal trips to doctors and therapists, addiction support meetings, places of worship, and protests. Camera placement near clinics, churches, union halls, shelters, or political events heightens this risk.

3. Chilling Effects on Speech, Religion, and Association

Residents who know their movements are logged may avoid lawful protests, religious services, or advocacy meetings. This concern is rooted in First Amendment associational privacy, not only the Fourth Amendment.

4. Out-of-Jurisdiction Uses That Local Voters Never Approved

Because data can be searched nationally, county data can be used to enforce policies of other states. The most widely cited example: in 2025, reporting by 404 Media showed a Texas sheriff's office searched tens of thousands of cameras nationwide, including in states where abortion is legal, in connection with a woman who had self-managed an abortion. The office described it as a welfare concern. Immigration-related searches through local agencies are covered in Tab 9.

5. Wrongful Stops From Bad Reads or Stale Hot Lists

ALPR misreads (similar characters, out-of-state plates) and outdated hot-list entries have led to high-risk stops of innocent drivers. A frequently cited case is a 2020 stop in Aurora, Colorado, in which a family including children was held at gunpoint after an ALPR-related misidentification. North Carolina requires agencies to update hot lists every 24 hours when updates are available, but no rule can eliminate misreads; every alert carries the risk of stopping the wrong person.

6. AI Attribute Search Widens the Net

Searching by vehicle color, type, or bumper sticker returns many vehicles unconnected to a crime. Bumper stickers can reflect political or religious views. Attribute search without a plate number is closer to a dragnet than a targeted lookup.

7. Uneven Placement and Disparate Impact

Where cameras are placed determines whose movements are logged most. Concentrating cameras in particular neighborhoods or corridors can produce unequal surveillance burdens. Residents in those areas bear a surveillance burden others do not.

8. Function Creep

Systems approved for stolen cars and missing persons tend to expand: more cameras, video, audio, drones, private feeds, and data integrations. Each expansion may proceed administratively. Each expansion adds risk the Board never voted on.

9. Private Cameras Outside Public Accountability

HOA and business cameras shared with law enforcement are not subject to a public procurement decision, and their retention and sharing settings may differ. North Carolina's ALPR statute is written for law enforcement agencies; it is unclear how fully it reaches privately owned systems that police can access.

TAB 6

Court Rulings & Constitutional Law

North Carolina is in the U.S. Fourth Circuit (with Virginia, Maryland, West Virginia, and South Carolina). Two of the most important cases below, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle and Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, are Fourth Circuit matters. A Fourth Circuit decision in Schmidt will be binding on federal courts in North Carolina.

Where the law stands (Oct. 14, 2026): courts are split. Most courts have so far held that ALPR use is not a Fourth Amendment search, and the Norfolk trial rulings that found otherwise were reversed. But on October 1, 2026, a federal district judge in Oklahoma held that a deputy's warrantless search of a driver's Flock location history was unconstitutional and suppressed the evidence (United States v. Kyle). Flock expects an appeal. The same day, a California court dismissed an EFF constitutional challenge, which EFF plans to appeal. The case for removal rests on the direction of Supreme Court doctrine (Carpenter, Chatrie), the Fourth Circuit's Leaders decision, the pending Schmidt appeal, rulings like Kyle, and the county's exposure if the law changes, not on any single decision.

Foundational U.S. Supreme Court Cases

Case	Holding	Why it matters for Flock
United States v. Knotts (1983)	Tracking a car's trip on public roads with a beeper was not a search.	The basis for the argument that public-road observation needs no warrant.
United States v. Jones (2012)	Attaching a GPS tracker and monitoring a car for 28 days was a search. Five justices signaled long-term monitoring raises privacy concerns.	Origin of the 'mosaic' theory: aggregate tracking differs from a single observation.
Carpenter v. United States (2018)	Obtaining 7+ days of historical cell-site location records is a search requiring a warrant, even though a third party holds the data.	Protects 'the whole of a person's physical movements.' The central question in ALPR cases is whether a network approaches that.
Chatrie v. United States (June 29, 2026)	6-3 (Kagan, J.): obtaining a person's phone location data from Google via a geofence warrant is a Fourth Amendment search. Reasonableness of the warrant remanded to the Fourth Circuit; good-faith exception left in place.	Extends Carpenter to a short (two-hour) window and weakens the 'third-party' and 'public exposure' defenses that ALPR supporters rely on. Commentators view it as strengthening the Schmidt appeal.

Fourth Circuit and Virginia Cases

Case	What happened	Status / significance
Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dept. (4th Cir. en banc, 2021)	Baltimore's aerial surveillance program, which photographed the city from planes, violated the Fourth Amendment because it enabled tracking of people's movements over time.	Binding in NC. Shows the Fourth Circuit will apply Carpenter to wide-area surveillance of public spaces.
Norfolk Circuit Court suppression rulings (Judge Jamilah D. LeCruise, 2024 and April 2025)	In two criminal cases, a Norfolk trial judge ruled that police needed a warrant to search the city's 172-camera Flock system, and suppressed the evidence. In the 2024 ruling she wrote that residents might be concerned to learn police were keeping a database of their movements for 30 days.	**Reversed.** In October 2025 the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the April 2025 ruling, holding that no warrant was needed (Daily Press, Oct. 17, 2025). The trial rulings remain a detailed judicial account of how a city-wide Flock network operates.
Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (E.D. Va., Jan. 27, 2026)	Two residents, represented by the Institute for Justice, challenged Norfolk's roughly 176 Flock cameras. The court granted summary judgment to the city: the network, with a 21-day retention window, did not capture the 'whole' of a person's movements. The judge cautioned that the answer could change, writing in effect: not today.	On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, No. 26-1227. Oral argument tentatively set for the week of Dec. 8-11, 2026 (UNC School of Government, Sept. 2026). Amici against Norfolk include the ACLU, EFF, Cato Institute, and EPIC. South Carolina led 15 other states and D.C. in support of the city, and **the N.C. Association of Chiefs of Police and the N.C. Sheriffs' Association also filed amicus briefs.** Supreme Court review is possible.

Other Notable Rulings and Enforcement

Matter	Summary	Relevance
United States v. Kyle (N.D. Okla., Oct. 1, 2026), Judge Sara E. Hill	A Tulsa County deputy followed a car because it had a California plate, searched its history in Flock and a second ALPR system (more than 50 sightings across several states), and used that travel history to justify searching the car. The court held the historical ALPR search was a Fourth Amendment search conducted without a warrant or adequate cause, described the network as indiscriminate mass surveillance, and suppressed all evidence derived from it.	One of the first federal rulings finding a Flock search unconstitutional. Not binding outside the Northern District of Oklahoma; the Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the issue. Flock says the ruling is limited to its facts and expects an appeal. The court acknowledged most courts so far have found ALPR use is not a search.
Commonwealth v. McCarthy (Mass. 2020)	Four ALPR cameras on bridges were not a search, but the court said a dense enough network could be.	Network density and retention drive the outcome.

Matter	Summary	Relevance
United States v. Thomas, 2026 WL 2656384 (federal district court, Calif., Sept. 9, 2026)	Rather than accept the government's position, the court ordered an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress Flock evidence, requiring testimony on how Flock searches work and what data officers can see.	Courts are beginning to examine Flock's actual capabilities instead of assuming plate reads are harmless.
Washington public records ruling (Skagit Co. Superior Ct., 2025)	A trial court reportedly held Flock images held by cities are public records subject to disclosure.	Different in NC: G.S. 20-183.32 treats captured plate data as confidential (see Tab 8).
Illinois Secretary of State review (2025)	State found out-of-state/federal access to Illinois Flock data conflicted with Illinois law; Flock disabled national lookup for Illinois.	States can and do enforce sharing limits.

Implications for the County

- The federal judge in Norfolk upheld the network only on its current facts and warned the line could be crossed as networks grow. Every added camera, sharing partner, and day of retention moves a deployment toward that line.
- A Fourth Circuit ruling against Norfolk would bind federal courts in North Carolina and could invalidate warrantless searches already run, jeopardizing prosecutions that relied on them.
- A federal court has now found a warrantless Flock history search unconstitutional (United States v. Kyle, N.D. Okla., Oct. 1, 2026). The evidence was suppressed, the outcome a prosecution in this county could face if the law moves the same way here.
- Chatrie (2026) and Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle (4th Cir. 2021) both point the same direction: courts in this circuit are treating aggregated location tracking as a search.
- Removing the cameras now ends the county's exposure before the law changes, rather than after.

TAB 7

Key Court Opinions: Citations and Sources

#	Case	Court / date	Citation	Why it matters	Full text source
1	Schmidt v. City of Norfolk	E.D. Va., Jan. 27, 2026	819 F.Supp.3d 492; No. 2:24cv621	The Flock case: network upheld 'on the current record,' with a warning	leagle.com (infdco20260130846); CourtListener docket 69288422
2	Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (motion to dismiss)	E.D. Va., Feb. 5, 2025	2025 WL 410080; ECF 29	Allowed the challenge to proceed	clearinghouse.net/doc/155908
3	Schmidt v. City of Norfolk (appeal)	4th Cir., pending; argument ~Dec. 8-11, 2026	No. 26-1227	Will bind federal courts in NC	Justia docket ca4/26-1227; IJ opening brief at ij.org
4	Chatrie v. United States	U.S. Sup. Ct., June 29, 2026	No. 25-112	Location data request is a search	supremecourt.gov, Opinions, 2025 Term
5	Carpenter v. United States	U.S. Sup. Ct., 2018	585 U.S. 296; No. 16-402	Warrant for 7+ days of location records	supremecourt.gov or Justia
6	United States v. Jones	U.S. Sup. Ct., 2012	565 U.S. 400; No. 10-1259	GPS tracking is a search; mosaic concerns	supremecourt.gov or Justia
7	United States v. Knotts	U.S. Sup. Ct., 1983	460 U.S. 276	Basis of the 'public roads' defense	Justia or CourtListener
8	Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore PD	4th Cir. (en banc), 2021	2 F.4th 330; No. 20-1495	Wide-area surveillance struck down in our circuit	aclu.org/legal-document/opinion-7
9	Commonwealth v. McCarthy	Mass. SJC, 2020	484 Mass. 493	Dense ALPR network could be a search	mass.gov or Justia
10	Commonwealth v. Riley	Ct. App. Va., Sept. 23, 2025 (unpub.)	Record No. 0572-25-1	Appeal from Norfolk judge's Flock rulings	vacourts.gov, Court of Appeals unpublished opinions
11	Va. Ct. App. reversal of Norfolk Flock suppression	Ct. App. Va., Oct. 2025	Record no. not published in coverage	Held no warrant needed	Daily Press, Oct. 17, 2025; vacourts.gov
12	United States v. Thomas	Fed. dist. ct., Calif., Sept. 9, 2026	2026 WL 2656384	Ordered hearing on Flock's capabilities	Westlaw
13	United States v. Kyle	N.D. Okla., Oct. 1, 2026	Published district court opinion	Warrantless Flock history search held unconstitutional; evidence suppressed	Northern District of Oklahoma (PACER); The Hill, 404 Media, Public Radio Tulsa

Further analysis: UNC School of Government, NC Criminal Law Blog, 'Quick Thoughts about Flock Cameras, the Fourth Amendment, and the Courts' (Sept. 14, 2026).

TAB 8

North Carolina Law & County Authority

Statutory summaries below are paraphrased. The full text of N.C.G.S. Chapter 20, Article 3D (G.S. 20-183.30 et seq.) is published at ncleg.gov.

Article 3D: Automatic License Plate Reader Systems (since 2015)

Provision	What it requires
G.S. 20-183.30	Definitions, including 'law enforcement purpose' (e.g., investigations, BOLOs, hot-list matches).
G.S. 20-183.31(a)	Any state or local agency using ALPRs must adopt a written policy covering, among other things: databases used, data retention, sharing with other agencies, operator training, supervision, data security and access, and use of other agencies' ALPR data.
G.S. 20-183.31(b)	Data may be obtained, accessed, preserved, or disclosed only for law enforcement (or criminal justice) purposes. Data may not be used to enforce traffic violations.
G.S. 20-183.32(a)-(b)	Captured plate data may not be kept more than 90 days unless preserved under a written preservation request, a search warrant, or certain other narrow exceptions.
G.S. 20-183.32 (disclosure)	Data may be disclosed only to a criminal justice officer at a state or local agency, or a similar federal official, for a legitimate law enforcement purpose under a written request. The statute treats captured plate data as confidential.
G.S. 20-183.32(d)	Systems must be updated from hot-list databases every 24 hours when updates are available.
Penalty	Unauthorized access, retention, or disclosure of ALPR data is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
DOT right-of-way program (HB 206, 2026)	The ALPR program on NCDOT rights-of-way, begun as a 2024 pilot (S.L. 2023-151) and extended to July 1, 2026, was made permanent through HB 206, ratified July 1, 2026.

What North Carolina Law Does Not Do

- Require a warrant or judicial approval before searching stored ALPR data.
- Limit the number or location of cameras, or require public notice of locations.
- Address immigration-related use, or restrict sharing with out-of-state agencies beyond the written-request requirement.
- Require local agencies to publish usage statistics, audit results, or misuse findings.
- Clearly govern privately owned (HOA, retail) cameras that law enforcement can access.
- Set any retention period shorter than 90 days. Three months of every resident's movements may be kept by default under state law.
- Specify independent audits; the policy must address supervision, but who audits and how often is left to the agency.

Statewide Expansion Context

The SBI's March 2026 report to legislators stated that 17 agencies had set up about 140 camera locations on state rights-of-way capturing tens of millions of reads, and Raleigh reported 227 stolen-vehicle alerts from three highway cameras between July 2025 and January 2026 (Daily Tar Heel, July 2026). With HB 206, ALPRs can be placed on state roads permanently, so county data may increasingly sit alongside a statewide network. State policy is moving toward more surveillance, not less; protection for county residents will have to come from the county.

County Authority: What the Board Can and Cannot Do

- **NC precedent:** in 2026 the New Hanover County and Davidson County Boards of Commissioners each voted to cancel their Sheriff's Flock contract, and both Sheriffs complied (Tab 15).
- **The Sheriff is independently elected** (N.C. Const. art. VII, sec. 2). The Board generally cannot dictate operational policies of the Sheriff's Office.
- **The Board controls appropriations** and may decline to fund, or fund at a different level, items in the Sheriff's budget request.
- **The Board controls contracts it executes.** If the county is the contracting party, the Board can require terms on retention, sharing, audits, penalties, and termination.
- **Municipal deployments** (town police departments) are governed by those towns. The county can coordinate but not direct.

TAB 9

Data Sharing & Federal Access

How Sharing Works

Each agency chooses sharing settings: no sharing, one-to-one sharing with named partner agencies, statewide sharing, or the National Lookup, which historically let an agency search data nationwide if it also shared its own. Settings can be changed in software, and several cities have reported that broad sharing was switched on without elected officials' knowledge.

Federal Immigration Access Through Local Agencies

- **404 Media (May 2025):** audit logs obtained through a public records request to Danville, Illinois, showed more than 4,000 national and statewide lookups between June 2024 and May 2025 citing reasons such as 'immigration,' 'ICE,' and 'ICE WARRANT.' ICE had no direct Flock contract; local officers ran searches on federal agents' behalf.
- **Follow-up local reporting** found related searches tied to agencies in Florida, Illinois (Evanston), New York (Syracuse), Colorado (Loveland), and Georgia (Sandy Springs).
- **Flock's response (2025):** ended a pilot program that gave federal immigration agencies access, and disabled National Lookup in states with conflicting laws (including Illinois, California, and Virginia).
- **University of Washington Center for Human Rights:** found federal immigration agencies searched data from Washington cities, including cities that had never shared directly with them, because of National Lookup. Some agencies did not know the setting was on.
- **Credential sharing:** the November 2025 Wyden-Krishnamoorthi letter described DEA task force members using a local detective's Flock login, including for an immigration-related search, without his knowledge.

Local Responses

Jurisdiction	What happened
Woodburn, OR (2026)	Ended its Flock contract after a city audit found federal immigration agencies queried its data through National Lookup, which had been switched on during a pilot without the city's knowledge.
Eugene, Springfield, Bend, OR	Paused or ended contracts after similar audit findings.
Columbus, OH (2026 audit)	Nearly 19.7 million searches had been run against Columbus's network by local, state, and federal agencies. Even after Columbus added query filters and cut off some partners, the scale of outside searching shows how far beyond local control a network's data travels.

North Carolina Considerations

North Carolina law permits disclosure to federal law enforcement officials for a legitimate law enforcement purpose under a written request and does not separately restrict immigration-related or out-of-state uses. Once county data is in the network, state law gives the county little ability to limit where it goes. Removing the cameras is the only way to guarantee county residents' movements are not searchable by agencies the county never approved.

TAB 10

Documented Misuse & Abuse Cases

The cases below are drawn from news reports and prosecutors' announcements. Charges are allegations; individuals are presumed innocent unless convicted. The Washington Post reported on August 2, 2026 that at least 50 law enforcement officers had been charged with or accused of misusing Flock and similar systems. The Institute for Justice maintains a running list.

Where / When	What was alleged or reported	How discovered / outcome
Wrightsville Beach, NC (Sept. 2026)	Police department member fired after an internal audit found misuse of the Flock system.	Internal audit; reported the day New Hanover County canceled its contract.
Brunswick County, NC (2026)	Sheriff's Office employee resigned following an investigation into alleged Flock misuse.	Internal investigation (WECT).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC (July 2026)	Officer accused of using Flock and other technology to help someone involved in a drug investigation.	Reported by WBTV.
Indianapolis, IN (Sept. 2026)	Five officers (four current, one former) charged. One officer faces 26 counts including stalking, accused of 1,396 unauthorized searches tracking seven women and four men. Another allegedly tracked his ex-wife's car 950+ times over six months, reportedly using a colleague's credentials.	Charged by Marion County Prosecutor; chief recommended firing. IMPD adopted new ALPR policy August 2026 requiring each user to sign.
Sharonville, OH (Oct. 13, 2026)	Police lieutenant indicted on a felony for 29 searches of a person's whereabouts for personal reasons, December 2024 to April 2026.	Admitted during a department audit.
Milwaukee, WI (2026)	Officer charged with misconduct in public office for tracking two people, one a romantic partner, reportedly 179 times.	Resignation was a condition of plea negotiation.
Menasha, WI (2026)	Officer charged with felony misconduct for tracking an ex-girlfriend's vehicle off duty.	Found after a complaint to another department, not internal oversight.
Kenosha County, WI (2026)	Deputy accused of using Flock to stalk a fellow deputy he was dating.	Under investigation per reporting.
Effingham County, GA	Former sheriff's office employee and DA investigator charged with stalking for alleged Flock misuse.	Criminal charges.
Kechi, KS (2022)	Police chief reportedly used Flock to track his estranged wife more than 200 times.	Resigned; charged.
Texas (2025)	Sheriff's office searched tens of thousands of cameras nationwide regarding a woman who self-managed an abortion.	Revealed through records obtained by journalists.
Multiple states (2024-25)	Local officers ran searches on behalf of ICE (see Tab 9).	Revealed through public records.

What Officers Typed as the 'Reason' for a Search

Flock and agencies often point to the required 'reason' field and audit trail as the safeguard against abuse. In September 2026, the Electronic Frontier Foundation published an analysis of Flock audit logs obtained through public-records requests, covering searches from 2023 through late 2025. It found officers in dozens of jurisdictions entering jokes, shrugs, and keyboard gibberish as the reason for searching residents' location data.

Agency (as reported)	Reason entered	Scope of the search
Lake County Sheriff's Dept., Indiana (July 2025)	"LMAO"	One plate searched across more than 19,000 cameras in 1,558 cities and towns
Goshen Police Dept., Indiana (May 7, 2025)	"idk"	6,474 networks representing 82,413 cameras
Barberton Police Dept., Ohio (Mar. 2024 - May 2026)	"LOL" / "lol"	Numerous searches
Harris County Sheriff's Office, Texas	"LOL" / "lol" entered as a case number	Multiple occasions
Kankakee County Sheriff's Office, Illinois (2023-2025)	"idk" / "idk lol"	Multiple searches
Richmond Police Dept., California	"Hehe" / "idk"	Officers counseled, according to the department
Eatonton Police Dept., Georgia	"HJKNUILH", "uiokjk.kuj", "GJLHBNMN"	Keyboard strings
Lake County Sheriff's Office, Ohio	"asdfg", "ghjkl"	One officer's searches began with 'investigation' and devolved into keyboard strings
Atlanta Police Dept., Georgia	"asdfga"	Keyboard string
Various agencies	"Haha," "blah," "TBD," "sexy," and "robbery I don't remember the case number leave me alone"	Multiple searches

- **Accountability was limited.** EFF contacted the departments involved and reported that many took no action. Richmond, California said officers were counseled; Belton, Missouri said it would investigate searches containing an insult.
- **Departments' explanations:** some said the searches were tied to legitimate investigations despite the entries, or that the entries reflected frustration with the software. Either way, an auditor reading 'LOL' cannot tell which searches were legitimate.
- **Flock's fix may make review harder.** In late 2025 Flock replaced the free-text reason box with a dropdown of categories. EFF warns that a generic category selection reveals even less about why a particular person's movements were searched.
- **Why it matters here:** North Carolina law does not require a warrant to search ALPR data. The reason field is often the only record of why a resident's location history was accessed, and these entries show it can be filled with anything.

Patterns Across Cases

- **Discovery is usually accidental.** Many cases came to light through a victim's complaint, a neighboring department, or a social media post, not through the employing agency's routine audit.
- **The 'reason' field is weak protection.** Searches require a typed reason, but vague entries such as 'investigation' or a single period were accepted. Wisconsin reporting found one department was the state's most frequent user of the '.' search reason in early 2025.
- **Credential sharing defeats accountability.** Shared logins make audit logs point to the wrong person.
- **Long durations.** Several cases ran for months or more than a year before detection.
- **Vendor fixes came late.** Mandatory case numbers and automated suspension of suspicious users were announced only in August 2026, after national reporting.

Why Policies and Audits Have Not Prevented Misuse

- **Written policies existed.** North Carolina and most states already require written ALPR policies; misuse happened anyway. Indianapolis adopted its new policy only after the abuse occurred.
- **Audits are self-policing.** Agencies audit their own officers, and most cases were found by outsiders. A system that depends on detection after the fact cannot undo a stalking victim's harm.
- **Search 'reasons' are easy to fake.** Typed justifications and case numbers can be entered falsely; credential sharing hides who actually searched.
- **Vendor fixes are reactive.** Case-number requirements and auto-suspension were announced in August 2026, years into the national rollout and only after press coverage.
- **The harm is irreversible.** Once a person's location has been revealed to a stalker, no discipline or audit restores their safety. The only certain prevention is not collecting the data.

TAB 11

Cybersecurity & Vendor Risk

Account Security

- **Wyden-Krishnamoorthi letter to the FTC (Nov. 3, 2025):** asked the FTC to investigate Flock, stating that Flock did not require multi-factor authentication for law enforcement users and that passwords for at least 35 customer accounts had been stolen, per cybersecurity firm Hudson Rock. A researcher also documented Flock logins offered on a Russian cybercrime forum.
- **Flock's response:** MFA now enabled by default, with Flock reporting roughly 97% adoption among law enforcement users.
- **Why it matters:** one stolen password can expose not just the county's cameras but every camera the county's account can search through sharing (the 'blast radius').

Device and Platform Vulnerabilities

- **GainSec white paper (Nov. 2025):** independent researcher Jon Gaines documented 51 findings across Flock license plate cameras, gunshot detectors, and compute boxes, with multiple CVE assignments. Reported issues included cameras that can be placed into a Wi-Fi hotspot mode with a shared default password, credentials left in firmware, and hard-coded secrets.
- **Exposed video cameras (Dec. 2025):** 404 Media reported dozens of Condor PTZ cameras streaming to the open internet without authentication; a reporter verified by walking in front of one.
- **Senate testimony (Sept. 23, 2026):** researcher Benn Jordan told the Senate Judiciary subcommittee that 55 vulnerabilities had been published and recommended required independent security testing for surveillance vendors, while noting Flock appears to take security more seriously than a year earlier.

Vendor Concentration and Governance Risk

- A single private company holds data from thousands of jurisdictions; a breach or policy change affects all of them at once.
- Vendor defaults (retention, sharing, search requirements) have changed several times in response to press coverage. The county should not rely on defaults the vendor can change.
- The vendor's own employees and contractors may have access to systems; contracts should define and log that access.
- Data residency, subprocessors, and law enforcement requests made directly to the vendor should be addressed in the contract.

Security Steps During Removal

- Export and preserve the complete audit logs (internal and Network Audit) before shutdown, for the public record and any investigation.
- Revoke all county user accounts and any outside agency access immediately upon the decision.
- Require Flock to certify in writing deletion of all county data, including backups, derived data, and any 'anonymized' or aggregated copies.
- Require removal or factory reset of all devices so no credentials or data remain on hardware.
- Ask Flock to disclose any known security incidents affecting county data during the contract term.

TAB 12

Common Arguments for Keeping ALPRs, and Responses

The arguments below are those most often made for keeping Flock. Each response draws on the record documented elsewhere in this report.

Argument you will hear	Response
'It reduces crime and solves cases.'	The studies behind these claims were run or supplied by the vendor. CBS News (2026) found Flock's claim of helping solve about a million crimes in 2025 unsupported, and criminologist Andrew Wheeler noted that 'assisted' cases might have been solved anyway. The 2026 University of South Carolina paper relied on Flock-supplied deployment data; the Institute for Justice found crime trends were already improving before cameras went up and the headline 11% figure depended on weighting. No independent study has shown a reliable overall crime reduction.
'It generated hundreds of stolen-vehicle alerts.'	An alert is not a recovery, an arrest, or a conviction. Alerts must be confirmed and can be wrong; misreads and stale hot lists have led to high-risk stops of innocent drivers. Ask for outcomes, not alerts.
'It helps find missing children and endangered adults.'	Those cases are rare compared with the millions of reads of uninvolved residents. Amber Alerts, statewide highway cameras the county does not pay for, and traditional investigation remain available.
'A federal court said it's constitutional.'	One district judge upheld Norfolk's network on its facts and warned the answer could change. The ruling is on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, which covers NC, and the Supreme Court's 2026 Chatrie decision strengthened the challengers' position. The county would be betting on the outcome of a pending appeal.
'Every court has upheld Flock.'	No longer true. On October 1, 2026, a federal judge in Oklahoma ruled a deputy's warrantless Flock search unconstitutional and suppressed the evidence, calling the network indiscriminate mass surveillance (United States v. Kyle). Most courts have upheld ALPR use so far, and the Norfolk trial rulings against Flock were reversed, but the law is unsettled: the Fourth Circuit hears Schmidt in December 2026, and the Supreme Court's 2026 Chatrie decision expanded protection for location data. Waiting for a final ruling means accepting the risk until it arrives.
'Cars are in public; there's no privacy.'	The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning for aggregated location data in Carpenter (2018) and Chatrie (2026). A single sighting is public; a searchable history of everywhere a resident drives is not.
'We have a policy and audits.'	Every agency in the misuse cases had policies. Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Menasha, and others were exposed by victims or outsiders, not by audits (Tab 10). And the audit trail itself is unreliable: EFF found officers entering 'LMAO,' 'idk,' 'LOL,' and keyboard gibberish as the reason for searches reaching tens of thousands of cameras, often with no consequence (Tab 10).

Argument you will hear	Response
'Flock fixed the problems.'	The August 2026 changes came only after national reporting, are vendor defaults the company can change again, and do not address national sharing, security flaws, or the legal risk.
'Other agencies need our data.'	Outside agencies' access is exactly the problem: federal and out-of-state agencies have searched local networks without local officials' knowledge (Tab 9). The county's obligation is to its residents.
'It's cheap compared with officers.'	The subscription is only part of the cost: staff time for audits and records requests, legal exposure, breach risk, and possible lost prosecutions if the law changes (Tab 13).
'Removing them makes us less safe.'	The county policed without Flock until recently. Funds can be redirected to investigators and proven prevention programs with no mass-surveillance risk.
'More agencies sign up than leave.'	Flock says new customers outpace departures, but 302 jurisdictions in 40 states have now ended Flock, including county boards and Sheriffs who examined it closely (New Hanover, Davidson, Guadalupe TX, Wythe VA). Florida and Texas acted statewide in August 2026, and one tracker counted 93 departures in August alone (Tab 15).

TAB 13

Liability, Contract Exit & Fiscal Impact

Legal Liability Exposure

- **Civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983):** wrongful stops from misreads, or tracking found to violate the Fourth Amendment if the law shifts after Schmidt. Claims typically target the officer and the employing office; whether the county shares exposure depends on who employs the officer and indemnification arrangements.
- **Negligent supervision or retention:** where an officer stalks someone using the system and audits were weak or absent.
- **State-law violations:** unauthorized retention or disclosure beyond Article 3D limits.
- **Data breach:** notification costs and claims if county-funded systems are compromised.
- **Evidentiary risk:** suppressed evidence in prosecutions if courts later require warrants.

Every one of these exposures ends when the cameras are removed and the data is deleted.

Contract Exit Review

Issue	What to find in the contract	Action for removal
Termination rights	Termination for convenience, for cause, or for non-appropriation	Use the non-appropriation clause if present; otherwise identify the earliest exit
Notice deadline	Days of notice required before renewal	Calendar the deadline; send written non-renewal notice
Auto-renewal	Whether the contract renews automatically	Give notice now to prevent renewal
Early-termination fees	Remaining payments owed on early exit	Quantify; compare with ongoing cost and liability
Prepaid amounts	Unused prepaid subscription	Request refund or credit
Data deletion	Vendor's obligations at contract end	Require written certification covering backups and derived data
Hardware	Ownership of cameras and who pays removal	Require vendor removal at its cost; restore poles and sites
Grant conditions	Whether grant funds carry repayment terms	Confirm with Finance before termination
Vendor data rights	Any license to retain 'anonymized' data	Demand deletion; document any refusal

Fiscal Impact of Removal

- Annual subscription and add-on costs no longer owed.
- Staff time for audits, oversight, and public records requests no longer required.
- Reduced exposure to civil rights claims, misuse litigation, and breach response costs.
- Funds available to redirect to investigators, victim services, or proven vehicle-theft prevention.
- Avoids future price escalators and add-on sales (video, audio, drones).

TAB 14

Jurisdictions That Removed Flock, and Why Reform Has Failed

See Tab 15 for the full list of jurisdictions that have removed Flock, including New Hanover and Davidson Counties in North Carolina.

Local Governments That Ended or Paused Flock

Jurisdiction	Action and reason
Austin, TX (2025)	City Council allowed its Flock program to end amid privacy and data-sharing concerns.
Evanston, IL (2025)	Ended its contract after finding its data had been accessible in violation of Illinois law.
Woodburn, OR (2026)	Ended contract after audit showed federal immigration agencies queried its data via National Lookup enabled without the city's knowledge.
Eugene, Springfield, Bend, OR	Paused or ended contracts after audit findings.

Why 'Keep It With Reforms' Has Not Worked

- **Indianapolis** adopted a new ALPR policy in August 2026, after the abuse that led to five officers being charged had already occurred.
- **Milwaukee** council members demanded training standards, supervision, audits, and an independent oversight body only after an officer allegedly tracked a partner 179 times.
- **Columbus** added immigration query filters, but its network had already been searched nearly 19.7 million times by outside agencies.
- **Flock itself** changed retention and search rules in August 2026 only after national reporting on stalking cases.
- In each case, reforms followed harm. Removal prevents it.

State Actions

- **North Carolina:** expanded ALPRs on state rights-of-way permanently through HB 206 (2026).
- **Virginia:** Norfolk's network operated under a 21-day retention window; Flock disabled National Lookup for Virginia cameras in 2025.
- **Illinois and California:** statutes restricting out-of-state sharing; enforcement actions led Flock to disable national lookup in those states.
- **Amicus coalition:** South Carolina led 16 states plus D.C. in supporting Norfolk at the Fourth Circuit.

Federal Activity

- **Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism hearing (Sept. 23, 2026),** 'Always Watching: Flock's Nationwide AI Surveillance Network,' chaired by Sen. Josh Hawley. CEOs of major surveillance companies, including Flock, did not appear. Witnesses included the Institute for Justice, which urged Congress to require a warrant for searches of historical plate databases, and an Arizona sheriff who warned AI-powered cameras threaten constitutional rights.
- **Bipartisan concern:** criticism has come from both parties and from civil-libertarian groups across the spectrum (ACLU, EFF, Cato, Institute for Justice).

Vendor Changes Announced August 2026

After national reporting on stalking cases, Flock's CEO apologized publicly and announced shorter default retention (7 days), required case numbers, and automatic suspension of suspected misusers. These changes are an admission that the system lacked basic safeguards for years, and they remain vendor policies the company can change at will.

TAB 15

Every Jurisdiction That Has Removed, Canceled, or Paused Flock

Summary

Category	Count	Meaning
Canceled	227	Government ended an agreement that was still running
Removed / deactivated	30	Cameras taken down or switched off by decision of the agency or governing body
Expired / not renewed	45	Contract allowed to lapse by decision not to renew
Total that ended Flock	**302**	**In 40 states**
Paused / suspended	109	Cameras off or use halted; contract not yet formally ended
Rejected before install	33	Governing body voted down a proposed contract
All entries	**444**	**In 44 states**

Method. This list combines the two public cancellation trackers, DeFlock the USA and Who Approved This, as of October 13-14, 2026, de-duplicated and cross-checked against news coverage. Each tracker links its entries to council minutes, press releases, or news reports. Paused jurisdictions and rejections before installation are listed separately from jurisdictions that ended Flock.

Statewide Actions Behind Many Entries

- **Florida (Aug. 31, 2026):** At Gov. Ron DeSantis's direction, the Florida DOT revoked all permits for license plate readers on state highways and ordered them removed within 30 days, citing misuse, data privacy concerns, and surveillance schemes. About 700 cameras were affected, and dozens of sheriffs and cities went further and ended or suspended their programs entirely.
- **Texas (Aug. 27-28, 2026):** Gov. Greg Abbott barred state agencies from spending state funds on Flock cameras. Dallas canceled 321 state-grant-funded cameras and other cities paused state-funded units.
- **Knox County, Tennessee (Aug. 31, 2026):** the County Commission unanimously passed an emergency ordinance banning fixed license plate readers and ordering about 143 Sheriff's Office cameras removed.
- **Washington State:** a 2025 court ruling that Flock images are public records, followed by a new state law (SB 6002), led sheriffs and cities across the state to shut cameras off.
- **Santa Clara County, California (Feb. 2026):** supervisors barred the Sheriff from using Flock, idling cameras in the cities the Sheriff serves.
- **Wisconsin (Sept. 2026):** after agencies in other states released shared Flock search logs in response to open-records requests, exposing Wisconsin investigative data, sheriffs and police in at least three counties suspended their systems.

Most relevant precedents for this county: the New Hanover County and Davidson County Boards of Commissioners each voted in 2026 to end their Sheriff's Flock contract. Sheriffs in Virginia (Wythe, Campbell, Giles, Bland, Appomattox), Texas (Guadalupe at the Sheriff's request), Missouri (Henry, Pulaski), Illinois (Henry), Arizona (Pinal), Colorado (Routt, Moffat), and elsewhere ended Flock themselves.

Part 1: Jurisdictions That Ended Flock

Canceled, removed or deactivated, or not renewed. North Carolina first, then all other states alphabetically.

North Carolina (8)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Asheville	Canceled	Aug. 25, 2026	Council 5-2; 11 cameras; mayor said contract allowed no pause short of termination
Chatham County	Canceled	Apr. 20, 2026	County board canceled its own contract
Davidson County	Canceled	Aug. 24, 2026	Commissioners unanimous; all 25 Sheriff's cameras removed; ~$76,000 redirected to mobile command unit
Hillsborough	Canceled	Oct. 2025	Unanimous; 10 cameras (~$81,500); contract let Flock disclose data on a 'good faith belief'
Macon County	Canceled	July 2026	12 cameras; defunded then removed
New Hanover County	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Commissioners 4-0 canceled Sheriff's $219,000 contract (stationary ALPRs); network searched ~2.98M times; Condor video cameras not included in motion

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Pittsboro	Canceled	2026	Board 4-1 terminated agreement including all amendments and renewals
Catawba	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Council denied funding after 60-day trial; cameras removed

Alabama (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Hanceville	Canceled	Apr. 17, 2026	4 cameras
Midland City	Canceled	Oct. 2026	Council vote
Walker County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

Arizona (10)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cave Creek	Canceled	Aug. 26, 2026	Local privacy rules could not govern a multi-agency network
Chandler	Canceled	Aug. 2026	40 cameras; audit anomaly / misuse concern
Flagstaff	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Unanimous after attempted guardrails failed to restore trust
Payson	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Sedona	Canceled	Sept. 2025	Unanimous; council said it was misled about data sharing
Sierra Vista	Canceled	Feb.-Apr. 2026	16 cameras; data ownership and AI-training concerns
South Tucson	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Surprise	Canceled	Aug. 17, 2026	28 cameras; asked Flock to remove all equipment
Tempe	Canceled	Aug. 26, 2026	~33 cameras; no replacement vendor; mayor cited misuse risk
Pinal County	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 29, 2026	Sheriff Ross Teeple declined renewal on Fourth Amendment grounds

Arkansas (7)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Camden	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Transparency concerns
Centerton	Canceled	Aug. 11, 2026	Council unanimous; 16 cameras
Greers Ferry	Canceled	Aug. 12, 2026	2 cameras; chief cited privacy and trust
Mayflower	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Police called the technology intrusive
Pea Ridge	Canceled	July 2026	7 cameras
Searcy	Canceled	Aug. 2026	22 devices
Farmington	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 10, 2026	8 cameras; vendor service problems

California (15)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Foothill-De Anza Community College District	Canceled	Feb. 2026	Lenses covered; sharing disabled
Los Altos Hills	Canceled	Jan. 2026	Resident concerns; no evidence of effectiveness
Santa Cruz	Canceled	Jan. 13, 2026	Council 6-1 after data was accessed by out-of-state agencies
South Pasadena	Canceled	Mar. 2026	14 cameras; reports of data shared with federal immigration agents
Stanford University	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Third-party network access risk
Brentwood (Shadow Lakes HOA)	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2026	4 HOA cameras removed from public right-of-way at council direction
Mountain View	Removed / deactivated	Feb. 2026	Deactivated after out-of-state and federal access in violation of state law
Richmond	Removed / deactivated	Dec. 2025	Data found shared nationwide unintentionally
Carmel-by-the-Sea	Expired / not renewed	2025	Lease not renewed
El Cerrito	Expired / not renewed	June 6, 2026	Council 3-2 against renewal; 40 cameras went dark
Hayward	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired
Los Angeles Police Dept.	Expired / not renewed	July 11, 2026	138 cameras; data ownership and federal access concerns
Nevada County	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired
Placer County	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired
Santa Barbara	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 23, 2026	12 cameras; no ALPRs operating after expiration

Colorado (10)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Denver	Canceled	2025-2026	Council unanimously rejected $66,000 extension (May 2025); 110 cameras removed Mar. 31, 2026
Douglas County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Englewood	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Council 6-0; Axon replacement also failed
Fort Collins	Canceled	June 2026	Canceled
Routt County	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Sheriff: cameras were in 8M+ searches by thousands of agencies; office unknowingly in National Lookup
Salida	Canceled	Aug. 2026	6 cameras
Steamboat Springs	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Chief deactivated 6 cameras after public forum
Louisville	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2025	Data sharing and capabilities misrepresented

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Elbert County	Expired / not renewed	Dec. 2024	Commissioners unanimous non-renewal over government overreach
Moffat County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 13, 2026	Sheriff; 10 cameras; cost, privacy, data sharing

Connecticut (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Bristol	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Windsor	Canceled	Feb. 2026	Council suspended then ended ALPR use
Killingworth	Expired / not renewed	2025	4 cameras; low utility; records burden

Delaware (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Wilmington	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Cameras removed

Florida (26)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Calhoun County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Clay County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Sheriff ordered removal
Fort Myers Beach	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Franklin County	Canceled	Sept. 1, 2026	~26 cameras deactivated
Gadsden County	Canceled	Oct. 1, 2026	25 cameras, $77,500/yr
Hernando County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Holmes County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Indian Harbour Beach	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Jackson County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Jacksonville Sheriff's Office	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Discontinued LPR countywide after FDOT memo
Jefferson County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Liberty County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Live Oak	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Council unanimous; 8 cameras
Nassau County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	34 cameras
Okaloosa County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Sheriff removing state and county right-of-way units
Oviedo	Canceled	2025-2026	Council directed defunding and removal (8 cameras)
Pasco County	Canceled	Sept. 30, 2026	Sheriff Nocco ended agreement: value does not override public trust
Putnam County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	18 cameras disconnected
Suwannee County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Volusia County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Sheriff shut down readers countywide
Wakulla County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Walton County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Alachua	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Removed after state order
Neptune Beach	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Removed after FDOT revoked permits
Panama City	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Shut down cameras
Clearwater	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired

Georgia (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Nelson	Removed / deactivated	July 13, 2026	Council unanimous; 4 cameras; Fourth Amendment concerns; first in Cherokee County

Idaho (4)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Jerome	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Jerome County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Lincoln County (Shoshone)	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Sheriff dropped cameras
Clearwater County	Expired / not renewed	July 2026	Sheriff non-renewal; prosecutor opined second-year payment void

Illinois (7)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cortland	Canceled	Aug. 24, 2026	Board unanimous; 5 cameras and poles removed
Evanston	Canceled	Sept. 26, 2025	19 cameras; state audit found illegal sharing; Flock reinstalled cameras against city's wishes
Henry County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Sheriff ended partnership despite no local misuse
Oak Park	Canceled	Aug. 2025	State investigation of sharing practices
River Forest	Canceled	Sept. 2025	Board vote
Sterling	Canceled	Sept. 21, 2026	Discontinued immediately
West Dundee	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired

Indiana (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Monroe County	Canceled	July 2026	6 cameras; outside and federal access risk
Bloomington	Expired / not renewed	Mar. 2026	$50,000 contract; 400+ residents objected

Iowa (5)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Clarke County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Coralville	Canceled	Feb. 2026	After months of public outcry
Iowa City	Canceled	Feb. 2026	Removed and terminated
Osceola	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Waukee	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 14, 2026	11 cameras; chief non-renewal

Kansas (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Gardner	Canceled	Aug. 17, 2026	Council: off immediately, no renewal
Wellsville	Canceled	Earlier	Canceled

Kentucky (6)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Fort Mitchell	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Terminated
Fort Thomas	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Hartford	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Independence	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Mayor ordered removal
Newport	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Erlanger	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 2026	Not renewed

Maine (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Auburn	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Cameras removed
Sanford	Canceled	2025	Ended after trial
South Portland	Removed / deactivated	June 2026	Removed amid statewide ban push

Maryland (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Hancock	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

Massachusetts (28)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Abington	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Chief ended agreement
Attleboro	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Auburn	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Contractual defect
Ayer	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Select Board 3-0
Barnstable	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Voted removal despite police objections
Boston	Canceled	2026	Canceled
Cambridge	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Flock installed cameras without authorization during a suspension
Cohasset	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Douglas	Canceled	Aug. 2026	All cameras deactivated
East Bridgewater	Canceled	Aug. 22, 2026	Chief ended contract after public forum
Easthampton	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Easton	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Grafton	Canceled	Aug. 22, 2026	Resident concerns; vandalism
Greenfield	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Groton	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Terminated immediately
Hopkinton	Canceled	Aug. 20, 2026	Town counsel found contract unlawful under state procurement law
Littleton	Canceled	2026	6 cameras; Flock reactivated system without notice
Methuen	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Canceled
Natick	Canceled	Jan. 2026	Pilot canceled over transparency and data ownership
Norwell	Canceled	Oct. 2026	Canceled
Stow	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Last camera removed
Tewksbury	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Canceled
Watertown	Canceled	Jan. 2026	Canceled before installation
Wellesley	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Bellingham	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 4, 2026	Pricing, transparency, FreeForm concerns
Dartmouth	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 29, 2026	Not renewed
Framingham	Expired / not renewed	June 30, 2026	Not renewed

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Salem	Expired / not renewed	June 30, 2026	Data ownership and local-control concerns

Michigan (9)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Dickinson County	Canceled	Aug. 10, 2026	4 cameras ended
Eastpointe	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Council vote
Ferndale	Canceled	Nov. 2025	Ended contract after community concerns
Menominee	Canceled	May 2026	Unanimous; cameras activated without council approval
Milford	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Westland	Canceled	July 2026	Removed after resident concerns
Marine City	Removed / deactivated	Nov. 2023	Removed over false positives
Clawson	Expired / not renewed	2026	Not renewed
Oceana County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 2026	Sheriff ended trial after negative feedback

Minnesota (10)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Brooklyn Park	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Poor data-sharing protocols
Columbia Heights	Canceled	June 2026	12 cameras; immigration data-sharing fears
Crystal	Canceled	Sept. 2026	6 cameras removed; sharing turned off
Saint Paul	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Sherburne County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	10 cameras
St. Louis County	Canceled	Aug. 14, 2026	Sheriff ended pilot; 10 cameras
West St. Paul	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Trial ended
Winona	Canceled	Aug. 2026	8 cameras
Duluth	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 7, 2026	Not renewed
Isanti County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 2026	8 cameras

Missouri (8)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Bolivar	Canceled	Aug. 11, 2026	Aldermen unanimous
Dutchtown Community Improvement District	Canceled	Mar. 2026	ICE data-sharing concerns
Seneca	Canceled	Feb. 2025	Ended after 90 days; security concerns
St. Charles County	Canceled	Aug. 20, 2026	28 cameras; civilian employee admitted personal searches
Weston	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Henry County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 10, 2026	Sheriff non-renewal on constitutional grounds
Pulaski County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 2026	Sheriff; will not replace with Axon
Willard	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 21, 2026	Chief non-renewal

Nebraska (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Ord	Canceled	Aug. 2026	2 cameras

Nevada (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Reno	Canceled	Oct. 2026	Canceled
Sparks	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

New Jersey (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cherry Hill	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

New Mexico (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Bernalillo County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Sheriff ended contracts
Grants	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Taos	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published

New York (8)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Auburn	Canceled	Aug. 20, 2026	Council unanimous; ~$120,000 contract
Ithaca	Canceled	Mar. 4, 2026	Common Council vote
Saranac Lake	Canceled	Mar. 2026	Public outcry
Scarsdale	Canceled	Aug. 2025	Canceled before installation
Syracuse	Canceled	July 14, 2026	13 cameras; data-sharing controversies
Tompkins County	Canceled	Apr. 2026	Organized community pushback
Tonawanda	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
North Tonawanda	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2026	Last camera removed

North Dakota (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Horace	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Council voted removal

Ohio (13)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Coshocton County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Cameras removed
Kent State University	Canceled	2026	Canceled
Lorain County	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Terminated
Lucas County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Olentangy Local Schools	Canceled	Summer 2026	Canceled quietly
Oxford	Canceled	Aug. 2026	First southwest Ohio jurisdiction to end Flock
Pierce Township	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Reynoldsburg	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Canceled
Wooster (college)	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Terminated
Worthington City Schools	Canceled	Sept. 1, 2026	Benefit not worth loss of trust
Wyandot County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Lebanon	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Council voted removal
Monroe	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Council voted shutdown

Oklahoma (6)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Coweta	Canceled	Aug. 2026	2 cameras; Fourth Amendment concerns
Marietta	Canceled	Aug. 21, 2026	Chief learned Flock retains data after the city's 30-day access ends
Thackerville	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Tahlequah	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Public trust
Broken Arrow	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	No Flock cameras operating today
Guthrie	Expired / not renewed	2026	Expired

Oregon (9)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Albany	Canceled	May 2026	Federal access concerns
Bend	Canceled	Jan. 2026	4 cameras; ended pilot early
Eugene	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Police identified vulnerabilities; camera reactivated without authorization
Josephine County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	10 cameras
Lane County	Canceled	Dec. 2025	22 cameras never installed
Lincoln City	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Springfield	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Community opposition
Winston	Canceled	Aug. 17, 2026	8 cameras; budget and public trust
Woodburn	Canceled	2025-2026	National Lookup enabled without city's knowledge

Pennsylvania (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Abington Township	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Thousands of searches appeared in public data dumps
Franklin County	Expired / not renewed	2026	Expired

Rhode Island (4)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Glocester	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Terminated
Narragansett	Canceled	Aug. 2026	4 cameras; low crime
North Kingstown	Canceled	Aug. 19, 2026	Council 3-2; 6 cameras taken down
South Kingstown	Canceled	July 2026	Cameras removed

South Dakota (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Custer County	Canceled	Oct. 2026	Sheriff ended contract

Tennessee (7)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Collegedale	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Council vote
Knox County	Canceled	Aug. 31, 2026	Commission unanimous emergency ordinance banning fixed LPRs; ~143 Sheriff's cameras
White County	Canceled	July 20, 2026	Commission rescinded authorization after defunding
Coopertown	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Privacy concerns
Kingston	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 30, 2026	Cost not justified
Knoxville	Expired / not renewed	Dec. 31, 2025	Contract lapsed
Sullivan County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 20, 2026	Commission 18-0 non-renewal after Sheriff suspended 10 cameras

Texas (25)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Aransas Pass	Canceled	July 20, 2026	Council 4-1
Bandera	Canceled	May 12, 2026	Council 3-2; equipment removed
Bastrop	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Unanimous; 12 cameras; barred future ALPRs
Dallas	Canceled	Sept. 15, 2026	321 state-grant cameras canceled after Abbott order (city-funded cameras continue)
Guadalupe County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Commissioners unanimous at Sheriff's request
Hays County	Canceled	Oct. 2025	Commissioners 3-2
Hewitt	Canceled	Oct. 2026	State funding pause
Hood County	Canceled	Aug. 11, 2026	Commissioners Court covered and terminated
Hutto	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Ingleside	Canceled	Aug. 2026	6 cameras
Lago Vista	Canceled	Aug. 2026	4 cameras; citizen petition
Leander	Canceled	Sept. 3, 2026	14 cameras; council stopped funding
Liberty Hill	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Council vote
Manor	Canceled	Sept. 3, 2026	Police ended relationship
Manvel	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Unanimous; 21 cameras; 535 outside agencies had access
Plano	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Wylie	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Ended use

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Burnet County	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2026	Fixed cameras removed
Austin	Expired / not renewed	June 30, 2025	Council blocked renewal
Grand Prairie	Expired / not renewed	Earlier	Contract expired
Kendall County	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 25, 2026	Commissioners 5-0; ~57 cameras; Sheriff had asked for another year
Magnolia	Expired / not renewed	Oct. 2026	Privacy, budget, limited use
Pflugerville	Expired / not renewed	Aug. 25, 2026	Council declined new agreement; cameras covered
Robinson	Expired / not renewed	Sept. 1, 2026	Council unanimous; 11 cameras
San Marcos	Expired / not renewed	Dec. 29, 2025	Council deadlocked; staff told to discontinue

Utah (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Washington Terrace	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Kearns	Removed / deactivated	Oct. 2026	Unified Police removed readers
Millcreek	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2026	Camera installed without city or police contract

Virginia (16)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Appomattox County	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Sheriff ended contract
Bland County	Canceled	July 11, 2026	Sheriff stopped use
Bridgewater	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Unanimous; 5 cameras; no ALPR without public process
Campbell County	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Sheriff canceled over privacy and civil liberties
Christiansburg	Canceled	Aug. 25, 2026	Council 6-0
Elkton	Canceled	July 2026	Shenandoah Valley wave
Giles County	Canceled	Aug. 26, 2026	Sheriff terminated
Goochland County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Harrisonburg	Canceled	July 2026	31 cameras
King William County	Canceled	Aug. 2026	Canceled
Lynchburg	Canceled	Sept. 3, 2026	Council 6-0; 15 cameras and 54 gunshot detectors
Martinsville	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Staunton	Canceled	Dec. 19, 2025	Chief rebuked Flock CEO's 'coordinated attack' remarks

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Wythe County	Canceled	Sept. 1, 2026	Sheriff: constitutional rights of the unaccused outweigh value
Augusta County (Fishersville)	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Sheriff removed cameras
Carroll County	Expired / not renewed	July 2026	Not renewed

Washington (14)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cle Elum	Canceled	Oct. 2026	Canceled
Edmonds	Canceled	May 2026	Canceled
Lynnwood	Canceled	Nov. 2025	Ended use
Mountlake Terrace	Canceled	Dec. 2025	Council unanimous
Skamania County	Canceled	Nov. 14, 2025	Sheriff ended use after public-records ruling
Moses Lake	Removed / deactivated	Aug. 2026	New state law forced shutdown
Ocean Shores	Removed / deactivated	July 2026	Removed Flock camera
Olympia	Removed / deactivated	Dec. 2025	15 cameras hooded and deactivated
Prosser	Removed / deactivated	Jan. 2026	Disabled over data access
Redmond	Removed / deactivated	Nov. 2025	Council unanimous to disable
Sedro-Woolley	Removed / deactivated	Oct. 2025	Deactivated after public-records lawsuit
Stanwood	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2025	Shut off pending court ruling
Walla Walla	Removed / deactivated	Jan. 2026	Disabled after public-records ruling
Maple Valley	Expired / not renewed	May 31, 2026	Contract expired

Wisconsin (17)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Appleton	Canceled	June 30, 2026	Concerns over system integrity
Clark County	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Dane County	Canceled	Apr. 16, 2026	County board 32-1 cut funding
Fitchburg	Canceled	Sept. 23, 2026	Council unanimous
Fond du Lac	Canceled	Sept. 4, 2026	Agencies ended use after search logs released out of state
Grand Chute	Canceled	2026	23 cameras

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Kaukauna	Canceled	July 2026	Ended contract
Kenosha	Canceled	Oct. 3, 2026	Chief cited data-sharing, security, undisclosed tracking
Menasha	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Council 7-1 stopped funding
Oconomowoc Area School District	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Racine County	Canceled	Sept. 2026	Sheriff ordered removal: 'not what we agreed to'
Sheboygan	Canceled	Sept. 8, 2026	Unanimous; 15 cameras; Flock offered to sell city's traffic data
Stoughton	Canceled	July 2026	5 cameras; bought out contract early
UW-Milwaukee	Canceled	2026	Ended; date not published
Verona	Canceled	Nov. 2025	Data access concerns
Hartland	Removed / deactivated	Sept. 2026	Removal ordered
UW-Madison	Expired / not renewed	June 26, 2026	8 cameras deactivated

Part 2: Jurisdictions That Paused or Suspended Flock

Cameras switched off or use halted, with the contract not yet formally ended. Some of these will become cancellations; a few may resume.

North Carolina (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Boone	Paused / suspended	May 2026	Paused expansion of cameras

Alabama (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Red Bay	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Arizona (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cottonwood	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused use

Arkansas (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cabot	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Suspended pending review

California (5)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Cupertino	Paused / suspended	2026	Cameras unusable under Santa Clara County policy
Grass Valley	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Fourth Amendment and data-sharing review
Oxnard	Paused / suspended	Feb. 27, 2026	19 cameras covered; out-of-state agencies queried data ~364,000 times after a vendor error
Saratoga	Paused / suspended	2026	Cameras unusable under Santa Clara County policy
Siskiyou County	Paused / suspended	Earlier	Suspended

Colorado (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Longmont	Paused / suspended	Dec. 2025	Halted data sharing while weighing exit

Connecticut (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Manchester	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Paused new cameras
Milford	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Florida (34)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Altamonte Springs	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Bay County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Bradford County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Brevard County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Clermont	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Cocoa Beach	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Dixie County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Edgewater	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Escambia County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Groveland	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Hillsborough County	Paused / suspended	Aug. 31, 2026	State-road cameras under FDOT memo
Kissimmee	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Lake County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Leon County Sheriff	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended pending oversight standards
Melbourne	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Miami-Dade County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 1, 2026	Sheriff suspended ALPR program in its entirety
Osceola County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Palm Bay	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Permitting compliance review
Palm Beach County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused new installations
Panama City Beach	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Pembroke Pines	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2, 2026	All LPR programs suspended
Pensacola	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Pinellas County	Paused / suspended	Aug. 31, 2026	State-road cameras under FDOT memo
Rockledge	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Sanford	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Santa Rosa County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Seminole County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
St. Cloud	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
St. Johns County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Sumter County	Paused / suspended	July 2026	Suspended pending internal audit
Tallahassee	Paused / suspended	Sept. 9, 2026	Commission unanimous; ~80 Flock and 75 Vigilant cameras turned off
Titusville	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Temporarily paused
Winter Park	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Winter Springs	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended

Georgia (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Dunwoody	Paused / suspended	Feb. 2026	Paused pending security and legal review

Illinois (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Homer Glen	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended
Moline	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused

Indiana (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Kosciusko County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Council 5-0 defunded; prosecutor ordered searches stopped and cameras down
Noble County	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Iowa (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Indianola	Paused / suspended	Aug. 17, 2026	8 cameras deactivated; outside access disabled

Kentucky (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Bellevue	Paused / suspended	Sept. 9, 2026	Council unanimous to disable until contract ends
Edgewood	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused
Florence	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Massachusetts (5)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Acushnet	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended
Boylston	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended; plans to terminate
New Bedford	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Paused; officer placed on leave
North Attleboro	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused new installations

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Southbridge	Paused / suspended	Aug. 31, 2026	Suspended pending public discussion

Minnesota (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Champlin	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended
North Branch	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Council voted to remove indefinitely
Shorewood	Paused / suspended	Mar. 2026	Suspended; exploring exit

Missouri (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Ferguson	Paused / suspended	Apr. 2026	Paused under new local rules
Platte City	Paused / suspended	July 2026	Paused park installation

Ohio (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Columbus	Paused / suspended	Sept. 3, 2026	Mayor paused; 65 cameras covered after alleged officer misuse
Dayton	Paused / suspended	May 2026	72 cameras; immigration-related searches contrary to city policy
Hamilton County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused pending clarity

Oklahoma (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Oklahoma City	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	90 cameras paused

Oregon (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Talent	Paused / suspended	Dec. 2025	Paused

Rhode Island (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Lincoln	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Paused

South Carolina (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Greer	Paused / suspended	Aug. 2026	Two officers fired over alleged unauthorized searches

South Dakota (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Codington County	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Tennessee (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Hamilton County	Paused / suspended	Aug. 31, 2026	Sheriff paused ~70 cameras over misuse concerns
Nashville	Paused / suspended	2023	Program signs removed 'for now'

Texas (5)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
El Paso	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Halted state-funded devices
Lufkin	Paused / suspended	Aug. 20, 2026	Chief suspended
Princeton	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended
Texas Dept. of Public Safety	Paused / suspended	Aug. 28, 2026	Gov. Abbott barred state agencies from spending state funds on Flock
Willis	Paused / suspended	Sept. 8, 2026	Mayor shut off system pending review

Utah (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Salt Lake City	Paused / suspended	Dec. 2025	Paused plan

Vermont (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Manchester	Paused / suspended	2026	Suspended

Virginia (8)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Amherst County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Sheriff cited discrepancies with Flock
Bedford County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Sheriff cited discrepancies with Flock
Charlotte County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused
Dumfries	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused installations
Halifax County	Paused / suspended	Aug. 28, 2026	Sheriff paused
Henry County	Paused / suspended	Aug. 14, 2026	Sheriff suspended and dismantling 14 cameras
Montgomery County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Sheriff paused for policy review
Wytheville	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Chief: public trust comes first

Washington (4)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Pierce County	Paused / suspended	Mar. 2026	Sheriff shut down after new state law
Renton	Paused / suspended	May 2026	Shut off again
Spokane County	Paused / suspended	Apr. 2026	Sheriff cited criminal risk to deputies under SB 6002
Wenatchee	Paused / suspended	Dec. 2025	Shut off after public-records ruling

West Virginia (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Putnam County	Paused / suspended	Oct. 2025	Suspended

Wisconsin (13)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Fond du Lac County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 4, 2026	Loss of control over investigative data
Fox Crossing	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Jefferson County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 10, 2026	Sheriff: data released without permission
Manitowoc	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Neenah	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Committee recommended termination
North Fond du Lac	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Ripon	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Stevens Point	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	10 cameras covered; no way to audit where data goes
UW-Oshkosh	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Waupaca County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 8, 2026	Committee cut funding; Sheriff suspended
Waupun	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended
Winnebago County	Paused / suspended	Sept. 4, 2026	Sheriff suspended
Winneconne	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Suspended

Wyoming (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Glenrock	Paused / suspended	Sept. 2026	Paused

Part 3: Jurisdictions That Rejected Flock Before Installation

California (4)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Eureka	Rejected before install	Feb. 2025	Council unanimous
Lakewood	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected
Oceano Community Services District	Rejected before install	July 2026	Rejected proposal
Santa Clara County	Rejected before install	Feb. 24, 2026	Supervisors 3-2 barred Sheriff from operating or using Flock data

Connecticut (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Colchester	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected

Florida (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Leon County	Rejected before install	July 2026	Rejected grant-funded cameras

Illinois (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Salem	Rejected before install	Apr. 2026	Canceled agreement over changed contract terms

Indiana (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Fort Wayne	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	Council rejected funding
Whiteland	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected

Maine (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Fryeburg	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	Select Board unanimous

Michigan (3)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Alpena County	Rejected before install	Mar. 2026	Rejected despite law enforcement support
Bay City	Rejected before install	Nov. 2025	Commission rejected
Sumpter Township	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	11 cameras never installed

Missouri (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Neosho	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	Police rejected

New York (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Poestenkill	Rejected before install	Dec. 2025	Rejected Sheriff's proposal

Ohio (5)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Green	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected
Ironton	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected
Kent	Rejected before install	Nov. 2025	Council rejected
Norton	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected
Streetsboro	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	Rejected before installation

Oklahoma (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Norman	Rejected before install	Aug. 2026	Council rejected

Pennsylvania (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Easton	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected

Rhode Island (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Portsmouth	Rejected before install	Jan. 2026	Rejected twice
Warren	Rejected before install	Dec. 2025	Rejected

Tennessee (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Chattanooga	Rejected before install	Sept. 2026	Rejected Flock contract

Texas (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Lockhart	Rejected before install	Oct. 2025	Council 6-1 rejected

Virginia (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Charlottesville	Rejected before install	Dec. 2025	Declined contract after pilot
Warrenton	Rejected before install	Oct. 2025	Council 5-1 permanently blocked ALPRs

Washington (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Gig Harbor	Rejected before install	Mar. 2025	Council rejected
Shoreline	Rejected before install	May 2026	Council rejected

Wisconsin (2)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Oshkosh	Rejected before install	Apr. 23, 2026	Council rescinded approval 7-0 after heat-map misstatement
Sturgeon Bay	Rejected before install	2026	Rejected

Wyoming (1)

Jurisdiction	Status	Date	Notes
Green River	Rejected before install	July 2026	Residents stopped proposed project

Why Jurisdictions Left

- **Outside access to local data**, including federal and out-of-state searches officials did not know about (Santa Cruz, Woodburn, Routt County, Oxnard, New Hanover).
- **Vendor conduct**: cameras installed or reactivated without authorization (Cambridge, Evanston, Littleton, Menominee, Eugene), misstatements about capabilities (Oshkosh, Sedona, Louisville), an offer to sell a city's traffic data (Sheboygan), and data retained after the city's access ends (Marietta).
- **Contract terms**: vendor disclosure rights (Hillsborough), no pause short of termination (Asheville), a contract found unlawful under state procurement law (Hopkinton).
- **Misuse by officers or employees** (St. Charles County, Greer, Columbus, Chandler).
- **Security and records exposure**: search logs in public data dumps (Abington Township) or released out of state (Wisconsin counties).
- **Constitutional concerns raised by Sheriffs themselves** (Pinal, Wythe, Henry County MO).
- **Cost** relative to uncertain benefit (Catawba, Kingston, Winston).
- **Future risk**: officials who trusted their current Sheriff still worried about future officeholders (Davidson County).

Lessons from Other Jurisdictions

- **Commissioners can act on a Sheriff's contract.** New Hanover, Davidson, Knox (TN), Sullivan (TN), Hood (TX), Kendall (TX), and Guadalupe (TX) county boards did so in 2026. Confirm the mechanism with the County Attorney (Tab 8).
- **Cancel every ALPR product and service, not only plate readers.** New Hanover's motion covered stationary ALPRs, leaving Condor video cameras under contract. Lynchburg's contract also included 54 gunshot detectors.
- **Disable national sharing and user access immediately** on the day of the vote, as New Hanover's Sheriff did.
- **Request refunds** of prepaid amounts (New Hanover sought ~$53,000) and check for early-termination fees (Lynchburg faced ~$35,000) or grant repayment terms (Bolivar).
- **Offer to redirect the funds** to another public-safety need, as Davidson County did with the Sheriff's agreement.
- **Bar a quiet replacement.** Several places (Bastrop, Bridgewater, Warrenton) also barred future ALPRs without a public process; others simply switched vendors.
- **Know what remains.** State highway cameras and private HOA or business cameras are outside a county cancellation (Asheville had about 86 such cameras).

Sources

DeFlock the USA, Cancellation Tracker (deflocktheusa.com/cancellations, accessed Oct. 14, 2026); Who Approved This, Flock Contract Cancellations (whoapprovedthis.org/cancellations, updated Oct. 13, 2026); EFF, 'Texas and Florida Step Back from ALPRs' (Sept. 3, 2026); Spectrum News, WSVN, and Engadget on the FDOT memo (Aug.-Sept. 2026); NPR (Feb. 17, 2026); WECT, WWAY, Port City Daily (New Hanover); WUNC, High Point Enterprise (Davidson); WLOS, Carolina Public Press (Asheville); ABC11 (Chatham); Sanford Herald (Pittsboro); Town of Hillsborough; WBTV (Catawba); Houston Chronicle Flock vote map; Newsweek; Roanoke Times.

TAB 16

Removal Plan & Draft Resolution

Recommended Action

The authors recommend that the Board end all county funding and contracts for automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems from any vendor, including Flock Safety, require certified deletion of all county ALPR data, remove all county-funded ALPR equipment, and acquire no replacement ALPR system without a public hearing and a vote of the Board.

Step-by-Step Removal Plan

Step	Action	Responsible
1	County Attorney reviews all ALPR agreements (Flock Safety and any other vendor) and identifies termination and non-renewal rights and deadlines.	County Attorney
2	Board adopts resolution ending funding and directing termination or non-renewal.	Board of Commissioners
3	Written notice of termination/non-renewal sent to Flock Safety and any other ALPR vendor.	County Manager
4	Complete audit logs and Network Audit exported and preserved for the public record.	Agency / IT
5	Independent review of past use, outside-agency searches, and any misuse, reported in open session.	County Manager / outside auditor
6	All user and outside-agency access revoked.	Agency
7	Each vendor certifies deletion of all county data, including backups and derived data.	Vendor(s) / County Attorney
8	Hardware removed and sites restored at vendor expense where the contract allows.	Vendor(s) / Public Works
9	Remove ALPR systems from future budget requests; decline grants requiring ALPR purchase.	Finance / Board
10	Public notice of completion, with certification letters posted.	Clerk / Communications

Related Recommendations

- Make the motion cover **every** ALPR product and service from any vendor, including Flock's plate readers, Condor video, Raven audio, and software such as FreeForm and Nova. New Hanover County's motion covered only stationary plate readers, leaving video cameras under contract.
- Disable national sharing and user access on the day of the vote, as the New Hanover County Sheriff's Office did, and request a refund of prepaid amounts.
- Consider offering to redirect the funds to another public-safety purpose agreed with the Sheriff, as Davidson County did.
- Request that the Sheriff discontinue access to private (HOA and business) ALPR cameras and cease querying other agencies' ALPR networks.
- Formally ask municipalities in the county to review their own ALPR contracts in light of this report.
- The county's legislative delegation should be asked to support state restrictions: warrant requirement for historical searches, ban on out-of-state and national sharing, shorter retention, and public reporting.

Proposed Resolution

A RESOLUTION ENDING COUNTY FUNDING AND USE OF AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER SYSTEMS

WHEREAS, automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems record the movements of every vehicle passing their cameras, the overwhelming majority belonging to residents suspected of no crime; and

WHEREAS, data collected by local ALPR cameras, including Flock Safety cameras in other jurisdictions, has been searched by out-of-state and federal agencies, at times without the knowledge of local officials; and

WHEREAS, law enforcement officers across the country have been charged with using Flock and similar ALPR systems to stalk and track individuals for personal reasons; and

WHEREAS, members of Congress have called for federal investigation of the cybersecurity practices of Flock Safety, the largest ALPR vendor, and researchers have documented numerous vulnerabilities; and

WHEREAS, the constitutionality of networked license plate reader systems is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; and

WHEREAS, independent evidence that these systems reduce crime is lacking;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Commissioners that: (1) no county funds shall be appropriated for automated license plate reader products or services from any vendor; (2) the County Manager shall provide notice of termination or non-renewal of all county agreements with Flock Safety and any other ALPR vendor at the earliest date permitted; (3) the County shall require written certification of deletion of all county ALPR data; (4) all county-funded ALPR equipment shall be removed; (5) no ALPR system shall be acquired or deployed with county funds without a public hearing and a vote of the Board; and (6) the County Manager shall report completion to the Board in open session.

TAB 17

Glossary & Sources

Glossary

Term	Meaning
ALPR / LPR	Automated license plate reader; camera and software that read and log plates.
Hot list	List of plates of interest (stolen, wanted, Amber Alert) that triggers alerts.
National Lookup	Flock setting allowing searches of other agencies' cameras across states.
Vehicle Fingerprint	Flock's AI cataloging of vehicle make, color, and features for search.
Network Audit	Flock log of searches run against an agency's data by others.
Mosaic theory	Idea that many lawful observations, aggregated, can amount to a search.
Carpenter	2018 Supreme Court case requiring a warrant for 7+ days of phone location records.
Chatrie	2026 Supreme Court case holding a geofence data request is a search.
Schmidt v. Norfolk	Pending Fourth Circuit challenge to Norfolk's Flock network.
287(g)	Federal program delegating some immigration enforcement functions to local agencies.
CVE	Public identifier for a documented cybersecurity vulnerability.
MFA	Multi-factor authentication: a second login step beyond a password.
SOC 2 / CJIS	Security audit standard / FBI Criminal Justice Information Services security policy.
Preservation request	Written request to keep ALPR data past the 90-day NC limit for a case.

Primary Sources

- N.C.G.S. Chapter 20, Article 3D (ALPR statutes): ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByArticle/Chapter_20/Article_3D.html (Tab 8)
- NC HB 206 (2025 Session) and enacted session law (Tab 8)
- UNC School of Government, NC Criminal Law Blog: 'License Plate Readers, Highway Pilot Program, and New Offense' (Nov. 2024) (Tab 8)
- Schmidt v. City of Norfolk, E.D. Va. opinion (Jan. 27, 2026) and Fourth Circuit docket (Tab 6)
- Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112 (U.S. June 29, 2026) (Tab 6)
- Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018); Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dept., 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Tab 6)
- Wyden-Krishnamoorthi letter to FTC (Nov. 3, 2025): wyden.senate.gov (Tab 11)
- Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing record and testimony, Sept. 23, 2026: judiciary.senate.gov (Tabs 11, 14)

News and Analysis Relied On

- UNC School of Government, NC Criminal Law Blog, Jeffrey B. Welty, 'Quick Thoughts about Flock Cameras, the Fourth Amendment, and the Courts' (Sept. 14, 2026).
- Daily Press, 'Virginia Court of Appeals reverses Norfolk judge's ruling that tossed Flock camera evidence' (Oct. 17, 2025).
- WHRO (Feb. 2026), federal judge's Norfolk ruling; RecordingLaw.com and Cato on the Fourth Circuit appeal; Footnote4a on state amicus brief.
- Paul Weiss, Stevens & Lee, Barclay Damon, and Bloomberg Law analyses of Chatrie (June-July 2026).
- Washington Post, 'How rogue officers turned a nationwide camera network into a tool for stalking' (Aug. 2, 2026).
- Fox59, Newsweek, CNN affiliates on Indianapolis charges (Sept. 23-25, 2026); WKRC Local 12 on Sharonville indictment (Oct. 13, 2026).
- The Marshall Project (Mar. 2026) and Wisconsin outlets on Milwaukee, Menasha, and Kenosha cases.
- Institute for Justice, list of ALPR stalking cases (2026) and critique of USC study (Sept. 2026).
- 404 Media (May 2025) on ICE-related lookups; follow-ups by Appen Media, Hoodline, NBC Right Now, ABC6 Columbus.
- WECT (Aug. 14, 2026) on New Hanover County retention and Flock CEO apology; KBTX/InvestigateTV and CBS News on policy changes and crime-solving claims.
- TechCrunch and SC Media (Nov. 2025) on stolen credentials; GainSec white paper (Nov. 2025); 404 Media (Dec. 2025) on exposed cameras.
- Daily Tar Heel (July 2026) on NC highway ALPR expansion and SBI report.
- Flock Safety blog posts on the Norfolk ruling and effectiveness studies (vendor perspective).
- NC removals: WECT, WWAY, and Port City Daily (New Hanover, Sept. 2026); WUNC and High Point Enterprise (Davidson, Aug. 2026); WLOS and Carolina Public Press (Asheville, Aug. 2026); ABC11 (Chatham, Apr. 2026); NPR (Feb. 17, 2026). Full list in Tab 15.
- Search-reason findings: EFF analysis of Flock audit logs (Sept. 2026); 404 Media, 'Cops Search Thousands of Flock Cameras for Reasons of LMAO, IDK, Hehe, and asdfg' (Sept. 2026); Techdirt (Sept. 15, 2026).
- Oklahoma ruling: The Hill, 'Federal judge rules warrantless Flock camera searches may violate 4th Amendment' (Oct. 2026); 404 Media (Oct. 2026); Public Radio Tulsa (Oct. 7, 2026); KTUL (Oct. 2026); Tech Times (Oct. 14, 2026).